ONCE UPON A TIME...
The department responsible for answering third party requests for bank information on bank customers received a letter from the national secret service. They have no instructions on how to handle those so they forward the question to the data protection officer.
The data protection officer (DPO) looks at the letter and scratches his head. The letter is not signed and it does not indicate the basis on which the request is made beyond a general reference to the law installing the secret service, which was recently amended with new powers for the secret service. There are however a contact person and his coordinates in the letter.
The DPO contacted the public number of the secret service as confirmed by a local police department and the public website of the secret service. There, by merely dropping the case number mentioned on the letter, the DPO asks to speak to the handling officer. Being passed on to the contact person as mentioned on the letter, the DPO could connect some dots. Thereafter, the DPO openly discussed his problem with a letter like that, because it would be quite easy for a fraudster to send such a letter to get access to information.
The secret service took the banks reaction seriously. A meeting was set up to discuss what procedure would give the bank sufficient comfort to answer questions. The solution included a two channel verification of the requests, letters having to be signed (by people on a list), a clear indication of the actual article on which the secret service based its request, etc.
COMMENT
There are some lessons in this story:- Always remain sceptic towards requests for information.
- The department responsible for answering third party requests made the right call to question whether or not this "non-standard" request could be answered.
- Calling upon authority is an often used social engineering technique. People are in awe of authority and tend to drop their guard for them. Being "healthily and respectfully critical" towards anyone calling upon authority is therefore often a good call.
- Do not investigate by using the contact information in a request. That would be the easy way but it is also what fraudsters expect you to do. They can control your investigation by answering your questions ... themselves.
- Here obviously the DPO had to end up with the secret service, but the way to get there was via a channel that was not under control of the initial sender.
- You may be surprised that even public bodies are prepared to enter into a discussion on how to set up the process.
- You can not always ask every potential person/body to be authenticated, but talking to a (set of) "test case" person(s) could help setting up a procedure that actually works, rather than not because it is too complicated, has to high a treshold, etc.
THE POWER OF STORIES
(repetition of the intro of the series:) Stories are of all times, but lately organisational behaviorists and marketers have a renewed interest in them. DPOs have stories as well of their own experience or heared in there community. And they should use them to engage the organisation, at least to raise awareness, questions and/or discussions. Note that we keep some obscurity and that any reference to a name or situation you may know is likely to be based on coincidence. :-)CALL TO ACTION
Do you have any good stories? Can you (pseudonomised) share them? (If so, please, do.)
Do you have experience with secret service requests?
Do you have experience with secret service requests?



